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During the last decades the use of experimental
auctions (EA) has gained recognition among econo-
mists as a tool for valuation of private and public goods.
In fact, Vickrey, random nth price, BDM (Becker,
DeGroot and Marschak) and English auctions are
mechanisms largely used today by economists, psycho-
logists and marketers interested in valuing new products.
The use of the auction procedure in experiments is
substantially based on results derived from pioneering
theoretical works of Vickrey (1961), Riley and
Samuelson (1981) and McAfee and McMillan (1987).
One of the most important results of this auction lite-
Short communication. Bid affiliation in repeated random 
nth price auction
F. Akaichi1, J. M. Gil2* and R. M. Nayga Jr.1
1  Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness. University of Arkansas. Fayetteville 72701. AR. USA
2  Center for Agro-food Economy and Development (CREDA-UPC-IRTA). Parc Mediterrani de la Tecnologia. 
Av. Canal Olimpic, 15. 08860 Castelldefels (Barcelona). Spain
Abstract
In most experimental auctions, it is a common practice to carry out several bidding rounds for the same product and
to post the winning price at the end of each round. This practice can lead to an affiliation of participants’ bids and
biased value estimates if bids between subjects are inter-dependent. In this paper, the effect of posted prices on bidders’
willingness to pay for a good using a random nth price auction is examined. The auctioned good was one kilogram of
the Protected Designation Origin (PDO) ‘Mongeta del Ganxet Vallés Maresme’ white bean, stored in a cloth bag. In
general, results indicate that bid affiliation is not an issue in the random nth price mechanism. However, consumers’
experience of the auctioned product matters. Experienced subjects are positively influenced by high posted prices
while inexperienced subjects tend to decrease their bids when the posted price is low. Interestingly, low posted prices
do not influence bids of experienced subjects and high posted prices do not influence bids of inexperienced subjects.
Additional key words: consumer experience; posted prices.
Resumen
Comunicación corta. Afiliación de las pujas en la subasta de enésimo precio aleatorio
En la mayoría de las subastas experimentales, es una práctica común subastar el mismo producto en varias rondas
y revelar el precio que el ganador tiene que pagar (precio de referencia) al final de cada ronda. Esta práctica puede
conducir a una afiliación de las pujas de los participantes y a estimaciones sesgadas si las pujas son interdependien-
tes. En este trabajo examinamos el efecto de los precios de referencia en la disposición a pagar de los pujadores uti-
lizando la subasta de enésimo precio aleatorio. El objeto de la subasta fue un kilogramo de la judía blanca ‘Mongeta
del Ganxet Vallés Maresme’, producto recientemente amparado bajo una Denominación de Origen Protegido (DOP).
En general, los resultados indican que la afiliación no es un problema en el mecanismo de subasta de enésimo precio
aleatorio. Sin embargo, la experiencia en el consumo del producto subastado es importante. Los participantes con ma-
yor experiencia tienden a aumentar sus pujas cuando los precios de referencia son altos, mientras que los participan-
tes con menor experiencia tienden a disminuir sus pujas cuando el precio de referencia es bajo. Curiosamente, los pre-
cios de referencia bajos no influyen en las pujas de los participantes más experimentados y los precios de referencia
altos no afectan a las pujas de los participantes menos experimentados.
Palabras clave adicionales: experiencia del consumidor; precios de referencia.
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rature is the incentive compatibility of the four mecha-
nisms mentioned above. An auction is said to be
incentive compatible when it induces each bidder to
submit a bid that sincerely reflects his or her value for
the good.
The incentive compatibility of an auction takes place
under strong assumptions such as the independence of
bidders’ values (not affiliated), the risk neutrality of
bidders, the absence of budget constraints, and the
symmetry of bidders (Krishna, 2002). Therefore, when
bidders’ values are affiliated in the sense that one sub-
ject’s value depends on another subject’s value, the
auction is neither incentive compatible nor efficient,
and the implementation of the auction as a pricing
method leads to biased valuations (McAfee and
McMillan, 1987).
In earlier empirical studies using experimental
auctions, it is a common practice to carry out several
bidding trials for the same product and to post the
winning price at the end of each round. Repeated trial
auctions are normally used for the purpose of market
learning1 and to enhance equilibrium behavior2. How-
ever, as mentioned by Harrison et al. (2004), bidders
who are unfamiliar with the auctioned product or
uncertain about the price of the good that can be pur-
chased outside of the experimental auctions take the
posted prices as signals of what the good should be
worth to them. The debate on the use of repeated rounds
with price feedback has not been settled. In fact, a
literature review of several empirical studies that have
been carried out to examine the presence of bid affi-
liation in experiments with repeated rounds reflected
conflicting results and conclusions. Some authors
defended the use of multiple rounds with price feedback
as an important approach in learning the auction market
and in improving understanding of the auction me-
chanism. However, others authors suggested the use of
single-round auction since their results showed an affi-
liation of participants’ bids when the auction market
price is posted after each round.
Kagel et al. (1987) auctioned a single indivisible
good among six bidders with positively affiliated pri-
vate value under a f irst price, a second price and an
English auction and found no evidence of bid affilia-
tion in induced value auction. List and Shogren (1999)
also conducted a second price auction where subjects
bid to obtain one of two sandwiches that varied in safe-
ty. They concluded that the general effect of repeated
rounds was to improve learning about the auction me-
chanism. Also in a Vickrey auction, Alfnes and Rickertsen
(2003) analysed European consumers’ willingness to
pay for four types of beef meat. They found that posting
of the clearing prices heavily increased the bids for all
the auctioned products and concluded that market
learning is responsible for this bidding behaviour.
Harrison et al. (2004) reanalysed the data in Hoffman
et al. (1993) who carried out a field experiment (Vickrey
auction) where participants bid for beef steaks in two
alternative retail packages. They found signif icant
effects of the lagged prices and argued that such effects
were due to aff iliation. To test the hypothesis that
bidders’ values become aff iliated when the auction
product is unfamiliar, Bernard (2005) conducted a
Vickrey auction to determine consumer willingness to
pay for non-genetically modified (non-GM) and organic
milk chocolate bars over conventional chocolate bars,
and organic over non-GM chocolate bars. The results
showed that participants’ values seem to be interde-
pendent. They concluded that «this led to affiliation
of values, which resulted in loss of potentially valuable
information in terms of the initial formulation of their
values». More recently, Corrigan and Rousu (2006)
used confederate bidders to control the effect of posted
prices over the course of multiple rounds in a Vickrey
auction. They showed that posted prices have a statis-
tically and economically significant effect on subjects’
bids in subsequent rounds for both familiar and unfa-
miliar products. As in Harrison et al. (2004) and Bernard
(2005), they suggested abandoning the use of repeated-
trial auctions and suggested the use of single-trial
Vickrey auctions that are preceded by a learning period
where the researcher can clearly explain the auction
mechanism and carry out a practical example with an
unrelated product to the subjects.
Some studies have also evaluated the issue of bid
affiliation using different mechanisms. For instance,
Rustrom (1998) and Lusk et al. (2004) compared results
from BDM and English auctions of five types of meat
steak and a box of gourmet chocolate and concluded
that bid affiliation is not responsible for the changes
in bids across bidding rounds. However, Shogren et al.
(2001b) found that subjects’ willingness to pay for both
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1 Authors such as Hayes et al. (1995), List and Shogren (1999); Shogren et al. (2001b), Alfness and Rickertsen (2003) and Lusk
and Shogren (2007) argue that using repeated bidding rounds allow bidders to learn and gain experience with the mechanism.
2 In several experiments, induced value studies showed the necessity to carry out multiple bidding rounds for behavior to conform
to the predictions of economic theory (Lusk and Shogren, 2007).
coffee mug and candy bar increases in a repeated
second-price auction but not in a BDM auction. They
concluded that affiliation of bids could be an explana-
tion for this difference in bidding behaviour between
the two mechanisms, but no formal test was carried out.
No other study, however, has examined the bid affil-
iation issue in random nth price auction. Shogren et
al. (2001a), Parkhurst et al. (2004) and Lusk and Rousu
(2006) used the random nth price auction as a demand-
revealing mechanism that can potentially substitute for
the second price auction. In this paper, the bid affilia-
tion issue in the random nth price auction was assessed,
mainly, for two reasons. First, this mechanism has the
desirable property that its pricing rule allows partici-
pants to be exposed to high and low posted prices. So
we expect that bidders will be able to judge better his
or her value when he or she knows the boundaries of
other bidders’ valuations. Second, no known studies
have addressed the effect of posted price (high and low)
on participant’s bidding behaviour in random nth price
auction. Therefore, this paper aims to empirically test
the influence of high and low posted prices on bidding
behaviour in random nth price auction and also show
if results change when consumers’ experience with the
auctioned good is taken into account.
To examine the issue of bid affiliation in random
nth price auction, an experiment that elicits subjects’
willingness to pay for a traditional variety of white
beans has been conducted in July 2006. Ninety subjects
were randomly selected from a list of people from
Barcelona and its metropolitan area who were respon-
sible for food shopping in their household, using a
quota system to guarantee that the sample represented
the appropriate population age distribution (the socio-
demographic and economic characteristics of participants
are reported in Table 1). The people who participated
did not have previous information regarding the goal
of the study, the type of product to be auctioned or the
conditions of the research. The experiment consisted
of nine sessions with eigth rounds per session.
The experiment was conducted in three stages. In
stage 1, recruited participants were randomly assigned
a specific day and hour to come to the laboratory for
the experiments. During the experiment, each partici-
pant received an envelope that contained €15 as
compensation for their participation, his or her identi-
fication number, ten bidding cards and a questionnaire.
In stage 2, the working of the random nth price auction
mechanism was explained to subjects. Specif ically,
subjects were informed that in the random nth price
auction each one of the participants offers a bid for the
auctioned product. Then the auctioneer orders the bids
from highest to lowest and selects randomly a number
n from a uniform distribution between 2 and k (k parti-
cipants). The n-1 highest bidders are declared winners
of the auction and the auctioneer sells them one unit
of the auctioned good at the nth price. For example if
n = 4, the three highest bidders each will buy one unit
of the auctioned good priced at the fourth highest bid
(Shogren et al., 2001a). After informing the subjects
about how the random nth auction works, a practical
example was then carried out with the auction of a
330 mL bottle of water. This practice session was con-
ducted in three rounds. After the practice session, the
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Table 1. Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of participants
Variables Categories
Sample Population
(%) (%)
Gender Male 21 47.3
Female 79 52.7
Age 18-34 years 39.4 35.5
35-49 years 32.3 35.1
50-66 years 28.3 29.3
Education level No formal education 2.3 11.5
Primary school 17.7 19.5
Secondary school 51.1 47.7
University degree 28.9 21.3
Income (in €) < 1,000 13.7
1,000-2,000 46.2 Not available
2,001-3,000 21.3
3,001-4,000 13.8
> 4,000 5.0
participants were then given the opportunity to ask any
question about the experiment or the auction me-
chanism.
In stage 3, after the training/practice session, parti-
cipants were provided an opportunity to closely exa-
mine the product to be auctioned. Once all the partici-
pants had finished inspecting the product, the auction
began. In each round, the subjects had to write on
bidding cards how much he or she was willing-to-pay
for one unit of the product. After each round, the bidding
cards were collected and numerically ordered based
on the bids. The number n was then randomly selected
from a uniform distribution, and the winner(s) was
(were) announced after each round. The winning price
was posted after each round. After all the rounds in
each session were performed, one round per session
was randomly chosen as the binding round to deter-
mine the winner(s). Once the results were announced,
the product was then handed out to the winner(s) who
then had to pay the corresponding market price.
As previously discussed, the objective of this study
is to assess the effect of high and low posted prices on
bidders’ bidding behaviour in a random nth price
auction. To achieve this objective, first high and low
posted price variables were constructed as follows. In
the experiment, the winning price is drawn from the
following uniform distribution {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10} since each session consisted of 10 subjects. Posted
prices equal to the second, the third or the fourth price
were classified as «high» while posted prices equal to
the eighth, the ninth or the tenth price were classified
as «low». Finally, the posted price was considered «me-
dium» if the drawn price was the fifth, the sixth or the
seventh price. In this study, 30%, 38% and 32% of
drawn prices were classified as high, medium and low
prices, respectively. To examine the issue of bid affilia-
tion and account for the panel nature of the data, a three
random-effects Tobit models were estimated.
[1]
where WTPit is the ith participant’s willingness to pay
at round t; αi is a random-effect intercept term; is 
a time trend; Hight–1 (Lowt–1) is equal to one when 
the posted price in round t–1 is high (low), and 0
otherwise; Freqwbi is equal to one if the participant is
an experienced subject of white beans (i.e., regular
buyers of white bean product), and 0 otherwise;
Knowledge is equal to 1 if the participant has a high
knowledge level about characteristics of the auctioned
product, and 0 otherwise; Gender is equal to 1 if the
participant is male, and 0 otherwise; Age is equal to 1
if the participant’s age ranges between 50 and 60 years,
and 0 otherwise; Income is equal 1 if the participant’s
income is higher than €3,000 mont–1, and 0 otherwise;
εit represents the contemporaneous error term. Equa-
tion [1] was estimated by maximum likelihood.
Results from the regression are reported in Table 2.
As can be observed in the f irst column, when the
overall sample is considered, the effect of posted prices
is statically insignificant. This result suggests that the
posting of high and low prices through rounds in
random nth price auction seems to mitigate bid affilia-
tion. Since the order statistic nature of the selling price
changes from one round to another, this perhaps makes
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Table 2. Results from random effect Tobit model estimation
Variable
Overall Experienced Inexperienced
sample subjects subjects
CONSTANT 2.128*** 2.782*** 2.314***
TREND –0.029*** –0.017 –0.039***
HIGH_1 0.067 0.151*** 0.008
LOW_1 –0.069 0.017 –0.130**
FREQ 1.013*** — —
KNOWLEDGE 0.430 0.727 0.150
GENDER –0.339 0.114 –0.548
AGE 0.226 0.383 0.138
INCOME –0.030 0.006 –0.076
LogL –540.41 –170.74 –360.05
Waldchi2 32.12 10.38 17.71
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.16 0.01
***,** Statistically significant at 1% or 5% level.
it very difficult for a bidder to learn about the other
bidders’ preferences and hence is likely to dampen bid
affiliation. If so, this finding can then be considered
one of the main advantages of using the random nth
price mechanism. However, since in the overall sample,
buyers of white beans (Freqwbi = 1) are willing to pay
a higher premium for the product, the sample has been
segmented between experienced and inexperienced
subjects. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show the estimates
for each segment. As can be seen, experienced subjects
[i.e., those who are regular or occasional buyers of the
product (37%)] are positively and significantly affec-
ted by high posted prices while inexperienced subjects
[i.e., those who do not regularly/occasionally buy the
product (63%)] are negatively and significantly influen-
ced by low posted prices. Hence, when the winning
price in round t-1 is high, experienced subjects mo-
ve up their bid to have a better chance of being in 
the winners group in round t. These results seem to
suggest that experience matters. Experienced subjects
are more likely to purchase the product and are more
interested in becoming the winners. On the other hand,
inexperienced subjects seem less interested in pur-
chasing the product and hence, move down their bids
when the posted price is low. This finding suggests that
experience or familiarity of the good can have an
influence on bidding behaviour and the nature of bid
affiliation.
No other known study has evaluated the issue of bid
affiliation in random nth price auctions. As discussed
above, bids using repeated random nth auction do not
generally seem to be affiliated to the extent present in
previous studies using repeated Vickrey 2nd price or
nth price/uniform price auctions (e.g. Kagel et al.,
1987; List and Shogren, 1999; Alfnes and Rickertsen,
2003). Interestingly, however, bid affiliation seems to
be more of an issue when subjects are separately ana-
lyzed by their degree of experience with the good. A
key contribution of this study is the finding that bid
affiliation does not seem to be prevalent in random nth
price auction when the whole sample is considered in
the analysis. This finding is no longer valid, however,
when the analysis is disaggregated by degree of sub-
jects’ experience with the product being auctioned. As
can be expected in experimental work, f indings can
create more questions important for future work. For
instance, while challenging, future studies should try
to design experiments that would definitively determi-
ne the reasons behind this study’s findings. Possible
reasons might be related to the competitive environ-
ment of experiments, role of psychological factors like
regret, etc.
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